| Esta discussão foi arquivada. Não se pode acrescentar nenhum comentário. | | | dava jeito conseguir fazer o mesmo... escutar as conversas de alguém que me interessa por algum motivo e ainda por cima serem eles a pagar...
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| | | | | por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-11-02 11:13 GMT (#11)
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| Esse é o negócio destes senhores: www.netline.co.il ;-) O que apresentam na página é apenas a ponta do iceberg. A razão que levou o exercito local a proibir os seus elementos de usarem telele para falarem para casa, conforme foi publicado nos media, foi a politicamente correcta. A verdadeira razão tem a ver com a tecnologia que tinham acabado de comprar a estes senhores. Impressionou-os de tal modo que tiveram que tomar contra-medidas. :D
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| | | | Isto faz-me lembrar a história do Gang que não só defraudou uma Telco Tuga em muitos milhares de contos, perdão, Euros, em equipamento, como também ganhava dinheiro fazendo disparar chamadas de qualquer número de telefone arbitrariamente seleccionado, para os seus números de telefone de valor acrescentado...
Parece que aqui aconteceu o mesmo... Coitados dos Teutónicos, devem ter lá uma peste a querer facturar por conta própria...
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| | | | | Será que a secreta Portuguesa tambem anda a ouvir as conversas de muita gente?
Gustavo Felisberto
72ef1d7183eb2ea89420b94c0cf3e1f1
apt-get install anarchism
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| | | | | | | Hmm.... Quem dera à secreta portuguesa saber quem é que a anda a escutar a ela! Digo eu, não sei...
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| | | por Anonimo Cobarde em 04-11-02 21:50 GMT (#3)
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| ...andaram a ver demasiado o hackers2, e julgam-se uns SuP3r l33T HaX0rZ...
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| | | | Afinal os germanicos nem sempre 'do it better' ;)
Não deixa de ser irónico que se pague o próprio servico de escuta.
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| | | | | | | Bem... numa prespectiva liberal, antes assim: Paga quem "beneficia" directamente do serviço e pronto. Repara que a alternativa era pagarem todos os contribuintes para que apenas alguns pudessem ter o privilévio de ser escutados...!
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| | | | E' que ao menos o Echelon passa despercebido ;-). http://www.ifrance.com/pzykoze/ec helon_photos.htm Achas mesmo que o Echelon passa despercebido? Deve passar tão despercebido como a carrinha da Pizza Hut que está estacionada em frente à minha casa há 10 dias, com uma parabólica e 2 gajos com blusões azuis a dizer FBI... ;)
"There are 10 types of people in the world: the ones who understand binary and the ones who don't." |
| | | | | | | Caramba! Ainda bem que me deste esse link! Vou mandar ao gajo uma foto da parabolica do meu vizinho que de certeza anda a ser usada para escutar!! [o facto de dizer "BSkyB" e' so' para disfarcar...]
"Monogamy is for guys that can't get pussy." --Steve-O.
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| | | | , it was revealed that the number belonged to the German secret service. The number was showing up on people's bills because they were being bugged - and paying for it. Understandably,
A spokesman for mmO2 blamed the incident on a "software error" and said it had now been fixed.
if (*(numbers_dialed+ipos+jfield_desc) !="DESC: German secret service"){
numbers_dialed_filtered += *(numbers_dialed+inum+jfilednum);
ipos++;
}
B0rn to frag!
ph34r da powa of da daemon =) |
| | | por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-11-02 14:16 GMT (#13)
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| uma instrodução sobre a necessidade de se ter software de encriptação, essa introdução é feita pelo criador do PGP....
"Senate Bill 266, a 1991 omnibus anti-crime bill, had an
unsettling measure buried in it. If this non-binding resolu-
tion had become real law, it would have forced manufacturers
of secure communications equipment to insert special "trap
doors" in their products, so that the government can read
anyone's encrypted messages. It reads: "It is the sense of
Congress that providers of electronic communications ser-
vices and manufacturers of electronic communications service
equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit
the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice,
data, and other communications when appropriately authorized
by law." It was this bill that led me to publish PGP elec-
tronically for free that year, shortly before the measure
was defeated after rigorous protest from civil libertarians
and industry groups. The 1994 Digital Telephony bill man-
dated that phone companies install remote wiretapping ports
into their central office digital switches, creating a new
technology infrastructure for "point-and-click" wiretapping,
so that federal agents no longer have to go out and attach
alligator clips to phone lines. Now they'll be able to sit
in their headquarters in Washington and listen in on your
phone calls. Of course, the law still requires a court order
for a wiretap. But while technology infrastructures can per-
sist for generations, laws and policies can change over-
night. Once a communications infrastructure optimized for
surveillance becomes entrenched, a shift in political condi-
tions may lead to abuse of this new-found power. Political
conditions may shift with the election of a new government,
or perhaps more abruptly from the bombing of a Federal
building.
A year after the 1994 Digital Telephony bill passed, the FBI
disclosed plans to require the phone companies to build into
their infrastructure the capacity to simultaneously wiretap
one percent of all phone calls in all major US cities. This
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User Manual PGP-INTRO(7)
would represent more than a thousandfold increase over pre-
vious levels in the number of phones that could be wire-
tapped. In previous years, there were only about 1000
court-ordered wiretaps in the US per year, at the federal,
state, and local levels combined. It's hard to see how the
government could even employ enough judges to sign enough
wiretap orders to wiretap 1% of all our phone calls, much
less hire enough federal agents to sit and listen to all
that traffic in real time. The only plausible way of pro-
cessing that amount of traffic is a massive Orwellian appli-
cation of automated voice recognition technology to sift
through it all, searching for interesting keywords or
searching for a particular speaker's voice. If the govern-
ment doesn't find the target in the first 1% sample, the
wiretaps can be shifted over to a different 1% until the
target is found, or until everyone's phone line has been
checked for subversive traffic. The FBI says they need this
capacity to plan for the future. This plan sparked such
outrage that it was defeated in Congress, at least this time
around, in 1995. But the mere fact that the FBI even asked
for these broad powers is revealing of their agenda. And the
defeat of this plan isn't so reassuring when you consider
that the 1994 Digital Telephony bill was also defeated the
first time it was introduced, in 1993.
Advances in technology will not permit the maintenance of
the status quo, as far as privacy is concerned. The status
quo is unstable. If we do nothing, new technologies will
give the government new automatic surveillance capabilities
that Stalin could never have dreamed of. The only way to
hold the line on privacy in the information age is strong
cryptography.
You don't have to distrust the government to want to use
cryptography. Your business can be wiretapped by business
rivals, organized crime, or foreign governments. The French
government, for example, is notorious for using its signals
intelligence apparatus against US companies to help French
corporations get a competitive edge. Ironically, US govern-
ment restrictions on cryptography have weakened US corporate
defenses against foreign intelligence and organized crime.
The government knows what a pivotal role cryptography is
destined to play in the power relationship with its people.
In April 1993, the Clinton administration unveiled a bold
new encryption policy initiative, which was under develop-
ment at National Security Agency (NSA) since the start of
the Bush administration. The centerpiece of this initiative
is a government-built encryption device, called the
"Clipper" chip, containing a new classified NSA encryption
algorithm. The government has been trying to encourage
private industry to design it into all their secure
PGP-INTRO Last change: JULY 1997 (v5.0) 3
User Manual PGP-INTRO(7)
communication products, like secure phones, secure FAX, etc.
AT&T has put Clipper into their secure voice products. The
catch: At the time of manufacture, each Clipper chip will be
loaded with its own unique key, and the government gets to
keep a copy, placed in escrow. Not to worry, though-the
government promises that they will use these keys to read
your traffic only "when duly authorized by law." Of course,
to make Clipper completely effective, the next logical step
would be to outlaw other forms of cryptography.
The government initially claimed that using Clipper would be
voluntary, that no one would be forced to use it instead of
other types of cryptography. But the public reaction against
the Clipper chip has been strong, stronger than the govern-
ment anticipated. The computer industry has monolithically
proclaimed its opposition to using Clipper. FBI director
Louis Freeh responded to a question in a press conference in
1994 by saying that if Clipper failed to gain public sup-
port, and FBI wiretaps were shut out by non-government-
controlled cryptography, his office would have no choice but
to seek legislative relief. Later, in the aftermath of the
Oklahoma City tragedy, Mr. Freeh testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee that public availability of strong cryp-
tography must be curtailed by the government (although no
one had suggested that cryptography was used by the
bombers)."
ande soi on ande soi on ....
para protecção pode-se sempre usar o PGPfone: Pretty Good Privacy Phone Owner's Manual
quantic_oscillation
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