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Echelon my ass!
Contribuído por BladeRunner em 04-11-02 20:58
do departamento esta-é-de-ir-às-lágrimas-:))))))))
Big Brother is watching you leitao escreve "Bom, quem era ingenuo o suficiente para pensar que o Echelon era o Big Brother supremo, por favor leiam este artigo hilariante publicado no The Register. E' que ao menos o Echelon passa despercebido ;-)."

MS ataca hardware | Pedido de Artigos para Porto 2002, Cidade Tecnológica  >

 

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  • artigo hilariante
  • The Register
  • Mais acerca Big Brother is watching you
  • Também por BladeRunner
  • Esta discussão foi arquivada. Não se pode acrescentar nenhum comentário.
    dava jeito.. (Pontos:1)
    por pcardoso em 04-11-02 21:14 GMT (#1)
    (Utilizador Info)
    dava jeito conseguir fazer o mesmo... escutar as conversas de alguém que me interessa por algum motivo e ainda por cima serem eles a pagar...
    Re:dava jeito.. (Pontos:0, Interessante)
    por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-11-02 11:13 GMT (#11)
    Esse é o negócio destes senhores: www.netline.co.il ;-) O que apresentam na página é apenas a ponta do iceberg. A razão que levou o exercito local a proibir os seus elementos de usarem telele para falarem para casa, conforme foi publicado nos media, foi a politicamente correcta. A verdadeira razão tem a ver com a tecnologia que tinham acabado de comprar a estes senhores. Impressionou-os de tal modo que tiveram que tomar contra-medidas. :D
    Re:dava jeito.. (Pontos:1, Redundante)
    por Montanelas em 05-11-02 11:34 GMT (#12)
    (Utilizador Info) http://www.war-zone.net
    Isto faz-me lembrar a história do Gang que não só defraudou uma Telco Tuga em muitos milhares de contos, perdão, Euros, em equipamento, como também ganhava dinheiro fazendo disparar chamadas de qualquer número de telefone arbitrariamente seleccionado, para os seus números de telefone de valor acrescentado...

    Parece que aqui aconteceu o mesmo... Coitados dos Teutónicos, devem ter lá uma peste a querer facturar por conta própria...

    Será que é para rir? (Pontos:2)
    por humpback em 04-11-02 21:42 GMT (#2)
    (Utilizador Info) http://www.felisberto.net
    Será que a secreta Portuguesa tambem anda a ouvir as conversas de muita gente?


    Gustavo Felisberto
    72ef1d7183eb2ea89420b94c0cf3e1f1
    apt-get install anarchism

    Re:Será que é para rir? (Pontos:1, Redundante)
    por js em 05-11-02 5:20 GMT (#10)
    (Utilizador Info)

    Hmm.... Quem dera à secreta portuguesa saber quem é que a anda a escutar a ela! Digo eu, não sei...

    Acho que... (Pontos:0, Engraçado)
    por Anonimo Cobarde em 04-11-02 21:50 GMT (#3)
    ...andaram a ver demasiado o hackers2, e julgam-se uns SuP3r l33T HaX0rZ...
    Impressionante (Pontos:2)
    por TarHai em 04-11-02 21:57 GMT (#4)
    (Utilizador Info) http://www.dilbert.com
    Afinal os germanicos nem sempre 'do it better' ;)

    Não deixa de ser irónico que se pague o próprio servico de escuta.
    ---
    Re:Impressionante (Pontos:3, Engraçado)
    por js em 05-11-02 5:19 GMT (#9)
    (Utilizador Info)

    Bem... numa prespectiva liberal, antes assim: Paga quem "beneficia" directamente do serviço e pronto. Repara que a alternativa era pagarem todos os contribuintes para que apenas alguns pudessem ter o privilévio de ser escutados...!

    Achas mesmo? :) (Pontos:2)
    por vfp em 04-11-02 23:45 GMT (#6)
    (Utilizador Info)
    E' que ao menos o Echelon passa despercebido ;-).

    http://www.ifrance.com/pzykoze/ec helon_photos.htm

    Achas mesmo que o Echelon passa despercebido? Deve passar tão despercebido como a carrinha da Pizza Hut que está estacionada em frente à minha casa há 10 dias, com uma parabólica e 2 gajos com blusões azuis a dizer FBI... ;)

    "There are 10 types of people in the world: the ones who understand binary and the ones who don't."

    Re:Achas mesmo? :) (Pontos:1, Despropositado)
    por leitao em 05-11-02 0:51 GMT (#8)
    (Utilizador Info) http://scaletrix.com/nuno/
    Caramba! Ainda bem que me deste esse link! Vou mandar ao gajo uma foto da parabolica do meu vizinho que de certeza anda a ser usada para escutar!! [o facto de dizer "BSkyB" e' so' para disfarcar...]


    "Monogamy is for guys that can't get pussy." --Steve-O.

    bug found (Pontos:2)
    por racme em 05-11-02 0:38 GMT (#7)
    (Utilizador Info)
    , it was revealed that the number belonged to the German secret service. The number was showing up on people's bills because they were being bugged - and paying for it. Understandably,

    A spokesman for mmO2 blamed the incident on a "software error" and said it had now been fixed.

    if (*(numbers_dialed+ipos+jfield_desc) !="DESC: German secret service"){
              numbers_dialed_filtered += *(numbers_dialed+inum+jfilednum);
              ipos++;
    }


    B0rn to frag!
    ph34r da powa of da daemon =)
    No manual do PGP vem.... (Pontos:0, Informativo)
    por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-11-02 14:16 GMT (#13)
    uma instrodução sobre a necessidade de se ter software de encriptação, essa introdução é feita pelo criador do PGP....

    "Senate Bill 266, a 1991 omnibus anti-crime bill, had an
              unsettling measure buried in it. If this non-binding resolu-
              tion had become real law, it would have forced manufacturers
              of secure communications equipment to insert special "trap
              doors" in their products, so that the government can read
              anyone's encrypted messages. It reads: "It is the sense of
              Congress that providers of electronic communications ser-
              vices and manufacturers of electronic communications service
              equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit
              the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice,
              data, and other communications when appropriately authorized
              by law." It was this bill that led me to publish PGP elec-
              tronically for free that year, shortly before the measure
              was defeated after rigorous protest from civil libertarians
              and industry groups. The 1994 Digital Telephony bill man-
              dated that phone companies install remote wiretapping ports
              into their central office digital switches, creating a new
              technology infrastructure for "point-and-click" wiretapping,
              so that federal agents no longer have to go out and attach
              alligator clips to phone lines. Now they'll be able to sit
              in their headquarters in Washington and listen in on your
              phone calls. Of course, the law still requires a court order
              for a wiretap. But while technology infrastructures can per-
              sist for generations, laws and policies can change over-
              night. Once a communications infrastructure optimized for
              surveillance becomes entrenched, a shift in political condi-
              tions may lead to abuse of this new-found power. Political
              conditions may shift with the election of a new government,
              or perhaps more abruptly from the bombing of a Federal
              building.

              A year after the 1994 Digital Telephony bill passed, the FBI
              disclosed plans to require the phone companies to build into
              their infrastructure the capacity to simultaneously wiretap
              one percent of all phone calls in all major US cities. This

    PGP-INTRO Last change: JULY 1997 (v5.0) 2

    User Manual PGP-INTRO(7)

              would represent more than a thousandfold increase over pre-
              vious levels in the number of phones that could be wire-
              tapped. In previous years, there were only about 1000
              court-ordered wiretaps in the US per year, at the federal,
              state, and local levels combined. It's hard to see how the
              government could even employ enough judges to sign enough
              wiretap orders to wiretap 1% of all our phone calls, much
              less hire enough federal agents to sit and listen to all
              that traffic in real time. The only plausible way of pro-
              cessing that amount of traffic is a massive Orwellian appli-
              cation of automated voice recognition technology to sift
              through it all, searching for interesting keywords or
              searching for a particular speaker's voice. If the govern-
              ment doesn't find the target in the first 1% sample, the
              wiretaps can be shifted over to a different 1% until the
              target is found, or until everyone's phone line has been
              checked for subversive traffic. The FBI says they need this
              capacity to plan for the future. This plan sparked such
              outrage that it was defeated in Congress, at least this time
              around, in 1995. But the mere fact that the FBI even asked
              for these broad powers is revealing of their agenda. And the
              defeat of this plan isn't so reassuring when you consider
              that the 1994 Digital Telephony bill was also defeated the
              first time it was introduced, in 1993.

              Advances in technology will not permit the maintenance of
              the status quo, as far as privacy is concerned. The status
              quo is unstable. If we do nothing, new technologies will
              give the government new automatic surveillance capabilities
              that Stalin could never have dreamed of. The only way to
              hold the line on privacy in the information age is strong
              cryptography.

              You don't have to distrust the government to want to use
              cryptography. Your business can be wiretapped by business
              rivals, organized crime, or foreign governments. The French
              government, for example, is notorious for using its signals
              intelligence apparatus against US companies to help French
              corporations get a competitive edge. Ironically, US govern-
              ment restrictions on cryptography have weakened US corporate
              defenses against foreign intelligence and organized crime.

              The government knows what a pivotal role cryptography is
              destined to play in the power relationship with its people.
              In April 1993, the Clinton administration unveiled a bold
              new encryption policy initiative, which was under develop-
              ment at National Security Agency (NSA) since the start of
              the Bush administration. The centerpiece of this initiative
              is a government-built encryption device, called the
              "Clipper" chip, containing a new classified NSA encryption
              algorithm. The government has been trying to encourage
              private industry to design it into all their secure

    PGP-INTRO Last change: JULY 1997 (v5.0) 3

    User Manual PGP-INTRO(7)

              communication products, like secure phones, secure FAX, etc.
              AT&T has put Clipper into their secure voice products. The
              catch: At the time of manufacture, each Clipper chip will be
              loaded with its own unique key, and the government gets to
              keep a copy, placed in escrow. Not to worry, though-the
              government promises that they will use these keys to read
              your traffic only "when duly authorized by law." Of course,
              to make Clipper completely effective, the next logical step
              would be to outlaw other forms of cryptography.

              The government initially claimed that using Clipper would be
              voluntary, that no one would be forced to use it instead of
              other types of cryptography. But the public reaction against
              the Clipper chip has been strong, stronger than the govern-
              ment anticipated. The computer industry has monolithically
              proclaimed its opposition to using Clipper. FBI director
              Louis Freeh responded to a question in a press conference in
              1994 by saying that if Clipper failed to gain public sup-
              port, and FBI wiretaps were shut out by non-government-
              controlled cryptography, his office would have no choice but
              to seek legislative relief. Later, in the aftermath of the
              Oklahoma City tragedy, Mr. Freeh testified before the Senate
              Judiciary Committee that public availability of strong cryp-
              tography must be curtailed by the government (although no
              one had suggested that cryptography was used by the
              bombers)."

    ande soi on ande soi on ....

    para protecção pode-se sempre usar o PGPfone: Pretty Good Privacy Phone Owner's Manual

    quantic_oscillation

     

     

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